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Abstract
External debt increases the vulnerability of indebted emerging market economies to
macroeconomic volatility and financial crises. Capital account reversals often lead sovereign
debt repayment crises that are only resolved after prolonged and difficult debt restructuring.
Foreign indebtedness exacerbates domestic financial distress in crisis, increasing both
the incidence and severity of emerging market crises. These outcomes contrast with the
presumption that access to international capital markets should help countries to smooth
domestic consumption and investment against macroeconomic shocks. This paper uses models
of sovereign to reconsider the role of sovereign debt renegotiation for international risk
sharing and presents an approach for analyzing contractual innovations for implementing
contingent debt repayments. The financial innovations that might allow risk-sharing rather
than risk-inducing capital flows go beyond contractual changes that ease debt renegotiation by
separating contingent payments from bonds.
Prepared for the Eighth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, ‘‘External Financial
Vulnerability and Preventive Policies’’, held on August 10-11, 2004 in Santiago. I am grateful
for many insightly and useful suggestions and comments from my discussant, Pablo Neumeyer,
and from Ricardo Caballero and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel. I also grateful to the organizers of the
conference and the Central Bank of Chile for inviting me to write and present this paper.
JEL classifications: F3, F4, F341
1. Introduction
In theory, international capital inflows should enable emerging market economies to reduce
the volatility of private and public consumption in the presence of income volatility in addition
to allowing foreign savings to finance domestic capital accumulation. Access to international
financial markets should provide opportunities for the domestic private sector and government
to diversify against aggregate country-specific income risk. In practice, international capital
flows to emerging markets are themselves volatile and sometimes propagate external shocks to
domestic consumption and investment or exacerbate domestic shocks. Higher levels of external
debt increase the exposure of developing countries to world output and interest rate fluctuations
and to the possibility of sudden capital flow reversals that may be poorly explained by country
fundamentals.
This comparison between theory and experience of borrowing by emerging market economies
motivates the arguments made below. The comparison suggests two questions: can the volatility
associated with external debt be reduced and can capital inflows be managed to reduce domestic
volatility? These are really a single question that is addressed directly in models of foreign
borrowing with country-specific income shocks and a risk-sharing motive.
Another feature of international borrowing by emerging market economies is the prospect
of default followed by the restructuring of public sector external liabilities, which can include
publicly-guaranteed private foreign debt. Debt crises, defaults and delayed debt restructurings
are all very costly and are associated with income losses for debtor countries. Debt renegotiation
may be seen as a means through which international debt contracts are revealed to be implicit
state-contingent contracts that allow the sharing of country-specific risks across borders. In this
sense, modeling sovereign debt renegotiation is a starting point for understanding the role of
debt contracts and of debt restructurings in international risk sharing. It also raises the concern
that this is a very costly way in practice to share risk and that welfare-improving innovations in
international financial contracting may be beneficial and possible.
The high costs of capital account crises, sovereign default and debt renegotiation led to renewed
calls for institutional innovation or market reform in recent years. Easing debt restructuring has
dominated the agenda because external debt burdens contribute to domestic macroeconomic and2
financial volatility and prolonged restructuring postpones recovery. Making debt restructuring
easier, however, raises the possibility that debtor default will become more probable as it becomes
less costly. Although easier renegotiation may be welfare enhancing ex post, it may raise debtor
moral hazard and reduce welfare ex ante by inhibiting capital flows to emerging markets. This
conflict needs to be evaluated in formal models of sovereign debt. The first part of this paper
considers how debt renegotiation in equilibrium models of sovereign borrowing affects welfare
and capital inflows. It discusses two major variants of equilibrium models of foreign lending
subject to sovereign default and explains how renegotiation enhances welfare in these models.
This discussion abstracts from the costs of renegotiation, but it does allow the costs of sovereign
default to be endogenous to renegotiation.
The standard consumption-smoothing model serves as a benchmark for considering how to
insure debtor economies against domestic and foreign shocks. Two versions of this model are
considered, one with perfect information and one with private debtor information. The second can
represent the sovereign’s private information about its political will or capacity to repay foreign
creditors or private information about the policies it is pursuing or expects to pursue. In the model,
the debtor government simply has private information about country fundamentals. Equilibrium
capital flows, implicit contracts and the interpretation in terms of debt contracts and renegotiations
are summarized in both versions.
Access to international financial flows serves to smooth domestic absorption against income
shocks in these models. This is achieved by state-contingent contracts, which are reinterpreted in
terms of debt renegotiation, in the perfect information case. Implied renegotiation is continuous.
In the private information case, conventional bond contracts implement the equilibrium with
default and renegotiation occurring in equilibrium only for high debt levels and poor income
realizations. In both models, implementation using GDP or commodity price indexed contracts
is considered. It is argued that contractual derivatives might be combined with standard bond
contracts to implement smoothing outcomes. In the case of private debtor information, delegated
monitors might be able to observe and monitor debtor fundamentals while dispersed bondholders
cannot. The paper argues that derivatives held by sophisticated creditors who monitor the debtor
can facilitate the successful issuance of conventional bonds to other investors that will not need to
be renegotiated in poor outcomes. The derivative contract is akin to a combination of interest and3
default swaps.
The volatility created by foreign interest payments for emerging market governments is
significant, as suggested by Borensztein and Mauro [2004] most recently. The procyclicity of
capital flows and public finance in emerging markets carefully documented by Kaminsky, Reinhart
and V egh [2004] is probably not an efficient outcome. Proposals to create GDP-indexed securities
are naturally supported by the arguments in this paper. The provisional implication of this paper,
however, is that achieving the needed state-contingency can be replicated using standard bonds
and derivative instruments rather than combining roles in a single financial instrument. This can
allow investors of differing monitoring capacities, risk attitudes and needs to choose between
low-risk bonds and risky derivatives.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses sovereign debt renegotiation and
summarizes the perfect information consumption-smoothing model. Section 3 discusses
the implementation of implicit contracts through renegotiation and through GDP-indexed or
commodity-price-indexed securities. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the imperfect information model
and its implications for contractual innovation, respectively. Section 6 briefly returns to the recent
debate over contractual innovation to ease debt restructuring, and the last section concludes. A
caveat is in order. The paper sketches properties and implications of the two models without
complete analysis or formal proofs. The complete analysis of one is in the literature, but the
second is wanting a full analysis.
2. Sovereign Debt Renegotiation and Welfare
The gains from access to international capital markets are well known. These are the traditional
gains from international risk sharing and allocating savings to the most productive investment
opportunities globally. Respect for the sovereign immunity of nations is one of the major
impediments to international capital flows and convergence of the net returns to savings across
borders. Immunity from interferencewith a debtor nation’s sovereignty inhibits theenforcement of
contracts between either sovereign or non-sovereign borrowers and foreign creditors. It rules out
direct enforcement of contracts involving sovereigns, hence reducing the ability of governments
to commit to fulfill the terms of contracts to which they are a party. The literature on foreign debt
has long identified sovereignty as a source of market incompleteness in international financial4
trade. Indirect sanctions, for example, restrictions on future access to credit or interferences with
commodity trade, are identified as means of enforcing debt repayment by sovereign borrowers or
non-sovereign borrowers subject to foreign legal jurisdiction.
The conventional modeling framework for sovereign borrowing imposes the constraint the
debtor pays only as much as is in its enlightened self interest to pay recognizing the consequences
of default. The observation that willingness to pay restricts international capital flows, articulated
by Wallich [1943], for example, was incorporated in formal models by Eaton and Gersovitz
[1981].1 In a riskless environment, willingness to pay leads to an upper bound on outstanding
country debt. With shocks, to country resources, preferences or world markets, lending to
sovereigns becomes risky for both creditors and debtors. Creditors face uncertain repayments as
the debt service that borrowers are willing to repay fluctuates with shocks, sharing the adverse
shocks realized by borrowers. Given external indebtedness, a borrower minimizes the cost of
a drop in domestic production or a foreign price or interest rate shock by choosing between
repayment and default. The risk of default is a reflection of the impact of foreign indebtedness on
the cost of volatility for the debtor country.
Simple models with exogenous penalties for default are useful for fixing ideas. If the penalty
for default is fixed, with a cost P in terms of debtor income each period, then the borrower will







where aggregate consumption, cs, equals an exogenous endowment, y, less the current repayment
or the penalty. For a discount rate higher than the international interest rate, r, the equilibrium debt
will equal the present value of the punishments, P. The loan is made at the outset. In this case,
creditors receive nothing from any additional lending. Assuming that default results in the penalty
P only in the period that the payment was not received is consistent with the bargaining model of
Bulow and Rogoff [1989a] which endogenizes the equilibrium cost of trade sanctions.
For volatile GDP , y is stochastic and there are incentives to renegotiate debt repayments. For
example, the penalty P can be the gains from trade, measured in units of a perishable exportable
good, which are lost if trade sanctions are imposed in a given period. With stochastic penalties,
default on a standard bond contract occurs whenever P<r D . Both creditors and the debtor5
forgo sharing the gains from trade if a default is declared and punished. However, there are
gains from state-contingent repayments, which might be achieved through ex post renegotiation
of repayments. If the stochastic penalty P equals stochastic repayments, equilibrium lending
and repayment are efficient subject to the constraints imposed by the inability of debtors to














Restricting contracts to standard debt contracts that are repaid with certainty restricts initial
lending to equal the present value of the smallest realization of P, rather than the expected present
value of the sequence of penalties. In the example, total lending equals
1+r
r P. Similarly, allowing
no renegotiation restricts repayments to equal rD when this is less than P and zero otherwise.









If debt repayments are renegotiable, then rD = P and renegotiation occurs with probability one,
but welfare is maximized subject to the sovereign immunity constraint.
This simple model illustrates two points. An increase in the penalty for default increases
potential capital flows and gains from intertemporal trade if sovereign immunity is a binding
constraint on foreign lending. The second point is that if renegotiation of repayments replicates
state-contingent repayments, allowing renegotiation increases welfare. This is true in an economy
withsymmetricinformation between debtorsand creditors. Renegotiation increasestheprobability
of default under a conventional debt contract but increases lending and welfare. Below, a model in
which the incentives to repay are endogenous to renegotiation opportunities is discussed at length.
If the debtor government guarantees the foreign debt of private borrowers but the sanctions for
default are shared, then the government needs to restrict domestic foreign borrowing to maximize
its welfare objective. At the margin, the private cost of borrowing will be less than the social cost
because private borrowing increases the expected costs of default. Similarly, as demonstrated by
Kletzer [1984], when foreign lenders cannot observe the total borrowing by the government or
guaranteed by the government, indebtedness is higher than is optimal for the government. The
sovereign needs to monitor its increase in liabilities and lenders have an incentive to coordinate6
lending by announcing loans and terms.
A consumption-smoothing model with stochastic debtor resources is used to analyze debt
renegotiation further. The consumption-smoothing motive generates gains from introducing
state-contingent repayments and offers a natural way for future credit access to provide incentives
for repayment. The model abstracts from capital accumulation, hence storage or borrowing for
growth, but productive capital and investment can be added to such models without changing the
qualitative implications for debt restructuring and renegotiation.
The objective of the sovereign is given by equation (1) where consumption can be taken as
aggregate consumption of residents, government consumption or recurrent public goods spending.
All external debt can be liabilities of the government, under explicit or implicit guarantees of
subnational public debt and private debt, for the first interpretation. In the other interpretations,
the only liabilities of the sovereign might be government debt used to finance primary deficits
of the public sector. The interpretation does not matter as long as u(c) is strictly concave and
increasing. The consumption-smoothing model is analytically equivalent to a tax-smoothing
model. Sovereign immunity is represented by the capacity of the sovereign to abandon foreign
capital markets. It is not required to borrow and the national endowment cannot be seized, or
otherwise impaired, by foreign creditors. Therefore, the sovereign can always choose permanent











where the endowment ys is stochastic and non-storable. This constraint is a self-enforcement
constraint on equilibrium, familiar from Thomas and Worrall [1988], Kocherlakota [1996], Kletzer
and Wright [2000] and Kehoe and Perri [2002]. For simplicity, the endowment can be thought of
as generated by an iid process, but the arguments apply when y follows a Markov chain.
Following Kletzer and Wright, self-enforcement constraints are introduced for risk-neutral
potential creditors as well. By assuming risk-neutral counterparties to contracts, the gains from
intertemporal trade are generated in the simplest analytical way that focuses attention on the








s−tτs ≥ 0, (5a)
where τs is the net transfer received by the creditor from the debtor in date s. For a single creditor,
τs = ys − cs. Several points are made in Kletzer and Wright. The self-enforcement constraint
for the creditor is important and represents the creditor’s ability to simply quit dealing with the
borrower. The lender does not need to provide a new net resource transfer (negative τ) unless it
raises its present value in expectation. This contrasts with the case of pure insurance, in which an
insurer may be required to make an indemnity payment that exceeds the expected present value
of insuring the insuree in the future. However, it does correspond to a bondholder or bank that
chooses whether to make a net payment to a borrower in anticipation of future repayments but
can always decide to buy a different asset. That is, the lender voluntarily makes new net resource
transfers to the borrower, in contrast to rolling over unpaid debt service.
Punishments are demonstrated in Kletzer and Wright that satisfy an important criterion. The
punishments are renegotiation-proof in a repeated game of consumption-smoothing and are
not permanent exclusions from the credit market (which are not credible under renegotiation).
The punishments can be interpreted as short-lived moratoria on lending which are credible in
the presence of potential renegotiation and entry by new lenders, although they also lead to
sudden increases in net capital outflows from the debtor country. An important result is that the
constrained efficient equilibria that can be supported by the threat of permanent loan autarchy are
sustainable using credible punishments. This means that the efficient outcomes of intertemporal






with respect to the entire consumption plan, {ct}, subject to








0, and theself-enforcement constraintsgiven by equations
(4) and (5a) which hold for all t. Thomas and Worrall [1988] solve for these equilibria and show
that consumption-smoothing is incomplete in general. For a high enough discount factor, β, near
unity, complete consumption smoothing in the steady state is possible, and for a low enough8
discount factor, but greater than zero, no credit transactions are feasible. In between, the debtor’s
consumption follows a Markov chain where consumption in period t is an increasing function
of previous consumption and current resources, ct (ct−1,y t). Consumption is non-decreasing in
debtor resources, but is not iid even if resources are when consumption is incompletely smoothed
in equilibrium. Also, to meet the self-enforcement constraints of each side of the market,
consumption will be higher than the endowment in low resource states and below it in high states.
The self-enforcement constraints on international credit transactions in this model imply that
the maximal net amount, τt, that the debtor will repay with the endowment, yt,i sg i v e nb y




s−t (u(cs) −u(ys)), (8)
where the right hand side of this equality represents the equilibrium gains from access to
international consumption smoothing for the sovereign. This is non-negative and provides the
motivation for debtor repayment. In equilibrium, the debtor’s consumption is greater than the
endowment in some states so that these gains are positive. That means that τt is not paid by the
debtor in all states at all dates; indeed, the actual net payment, τt, will be negative indicating a
net resource inflow in many events in equilibrium. After no point can the debtor repay on net
with certainty. Otherwise, the debtor would not gain by repaying and would opt for permanent
autarchy.. However, risk aversion implies that the debtor can repay in expectation.
The efficient solution maximizes these gains subject to the self-enforcement constraints.
Therefore, any increase in the gains from trade increase the amount that the debtor will repay.
Eliminating state-contingent repayments reduces the gains from trade reducing the incentives
to repay. An interpretation of debt renegotiation is that the standard debt contract is a guide
for an implicit state-contingent contract. The implicit contract is the state contingent contract
that supports the constrained efficient equilibrium. In this interpretation, renegotiation in a
long-term debtor-creditor relationship implements the state-contingent contract. The opportunity
for renegotiation in this perfect information economy increases the gains from trade and increases
the incentives for debtor repayment in high endowment states.
Two complications might reverse this conclusion. One is the presence of asymmetric
information between the sovereign debtor and foreign creditors. For example, if debtor resources
depend on unobserved debtor policies, then creditors face debtor moral hazard. However, the9
general model is still informative. In models of risk sharing under repeated moral hazard, partial
risk sharing is an equilibrium outcome and reported low outputs lead to both lower current
consumption and lower future surplus for the debtor in constrained efficient equilibrium. This
just parallels the equilibrium under perfect information with incomplete risk sharing due to
self-enforcement constraints. Since an implicit state-contingent contract supports the constrained
optimum, renegotiation of a simple debt contract in a long-term debtor-creditor relationship will
be welfare improving. Information asymmetries matter, but debtor moral hazard may not mean
that easing renegotiation reduces welfare and capital flows.
The other potential complication is that creditor rights across different creditors or classes of
creditors may not be well-defined in debt renegotiations. One example is the lack of definitive
seniority rights of various creditors that can make renegotiation a prolonged and costly process
that reduces welfare. Problems of coordination between different creditors and between creditors
and the debtor that can arise because of uncertain or ill-defined creditor rights may explain the
prolonged and costly process of restructuring emerging market debt. In a second best world, the
net effect of reducing these costs could be negative but it can also be positive, depending on the
very details of other multiple market failures.
The consumption-smoothing model without self-enforcement constraints helps illustrate.
The standard non-contingent debt contract raises welfare, smoothing consumption forward, by




for equal discount rates for both sides of the market (as assumed here). Total wealth and the
marginal utility of consumption follow Martingales. The first-best allocation is implemented by
state-contingent, pure insurance, contracts so that
ct = ct+1 (10)
in all events. The steady state is achieved immediately in the unconstrained optimum. In the
equilibrium of the permanent income model with uncontingent debt, the country’s welfare will fall
below its autarchy welfare (utility from consuming the stochastic endowment every period) with
positive probability. Therefore, when self-enforcement constraints are imposed, the probability
of default against the standard debt contract will be positive. For state-contingent contracts,10
self-enforcement constraints due to debtor sovereign immunity and limited lender liability impede
full consumption smoothing, but the constrained efficient equilibrium reduces consumption
volatility and reaches a stochastic steady state.
3. Implementing State-Contingent Repayments
The constrained efficient equilibrium for sovereign borrowing can be supported by a long-term
state-contingent contract or by an implicit contract achieved through renegotiation of standard
short-term debt contracts. Short-term contracts suffice because the self-enforcement constraints
arise because neither lenders or borrowers can commit to make net foreign payments. New net
loans or repayments are made because the lender or the borrower, respectively, gains by doing so
looking forward.
The constrained efficient equilibrium is characterized with proof in Kletzer and Wright. A
brief summary, with some extension, is given here. The sovereign borrower’s endowment has a
finite support given by 0 <y 1 <y 2... < yN. The endowment at time t, yt, follows a stationary
Markov chain over these N values that displays first-order stochastic dominance. For each yj,t h e
borrower’s consumption in equilibrium lies in an interval, denoted
￿
cj,cj￿
where cj ≤ yj ≤ cj.











2 < ... < c
N = y
N
for a large range of discount rates. Consumption is smoothed as much as possible across states
within the bounds of these intervals. That is, if y rises from y1 to y2 in period t +1then
ct+1 will either equal ct or c2 whichever is larger. Consumption ratchets upward or downward
following the endowment. Since consumption is not fully smoothed in general, consumption in
any state depends on lagged consumption as well the current endowment. Therefore, consumption
is smoothed against small income drops and falls with large ones. When income recovers,
consumption is again smoothed for small increases and rises for large endowment increases. For
a coefficient of variation in GDP growth equal to 3 to 4 percent (reasonable values for Latin
America), partial smoothing in this model is possible for real discount rates on the order of 3 to 511
percent for intertemporal elasticities of substitution onthe order of 0.3to 0.5. These are reasonable
ranges.
Consumption can be translated into net repayments, τ, which therefore also follow a Markov
chain, τt = τ (τt−1,y t),w h e r eτt is increasing in both arguments. This net transfer can be written
as the difference between gross capital inflows, new loans,  t, and gross repayments, Rt ( t−1,y t).
Repayments are state-contingent, and loans are single-period contracts. Under free entry by
lenders, the expected profits for each loan satisfy
Etπ = − t + βEtRt+1 ( t,y t+1)=0 . (11)
Therefore, the present value returns to creditors can be written as
U
c








s−t (− s−1 + βRs ( s−1,y s)), (12)




This is restricted to be greater than or equal to zero by the self-enforcement constraint.
The proper interpretation is that the constrained efficient equilibrium can be implemented by a
sequence of single-period loan contracts with non-negative contingent repayments. These can be
implemented by implicit contracts using standard non-contingent debt contracts with renegotiated
repayment. The contract made at time t − 1 will be the pair,  t−1 and Rt = maxyt {Rt ( t−1,y t)},
as suggested by Grossman and van Huyck [1988], which will be achieved for the highest state,
yN. Renegotiation results in repayments 0 ≤ Rt ( t−1,y t) ≤ Rt.
The self-enforcement constraint imposed on creditors is essential for interpreting state-
contingent repayments as renegotiations. The constraint formalizes the assumption that lenders
only makenet resourcetransfersto sovereign debtors if they anticipatereceiving future repayments
in return that are at least as great in expected present value. That is, net real transfers from foreign
lenders are loans. If the constraint, Uc
t = Rt ≥ 0, is relaxed, then an implicit contract no longer
works. Lenders must commit in period t − 1 to make positive payments in some states in period
t that leave them with lower utility than if they simply stop transacting with the debtor if Rt can
be negative. Commitment requires exogenous enforcement and an explicit contract specifying
performance.
Consumption smoothing with one-sided commitment is analyzed by Worrall [1990]. Bulow12
and Rogoff [1989b] also assume creditor commitment and argue that international lending cannot
be supported by reputational equilibria. Kletzer and Wright [2000] explain how the assumption
of creditor commitment is essential to the argument and that renegotiation-proof reputational
equilibria only fail if the lenders provide pure insurance; that is, if lenders commit to make
indemnity payments that they will prefer to renege on.2 However, with international insurance
enforced by creditor country governments, international capital flows are supported and begin
with the accumulation of foreign assets by the emerging market economy, as implied by the
equilibrium in Worrall [1990]. When only one side to an insurance or loan contract can commit,
the first payment must be made by the party that cannot commit.
The equilibrium if foreign creditors can commit future payments to the sovereign borrower









Debtor consumption is smoothed against output decreases and rises with output. This means that
consumption rises monotonically over time to a completely smoothed steady state. Net payments
by the debtor decrease monotonically over time.
In practice, sovereign debt renegotiation is a tedious, prolonged and costly process. External
debt exposure also contributes to domestic public and private consumption volatility. This is just
the opposite of what should happen in theory. Proposals for introducing GDP-indexed securities,
or commodity bonds for primary commodity dependent exporters, have been revived recently.
The theoretical model summarized above suggests that there should be gains from introducing
bonds with GDP-contingent repayments. Implementing the implicit repayments, Rt ( t−1,y t),a s
GDP-indexed repayments is straightforward in theory. As long as GDP measurement is clearly
defined and not subject to moral hazard, such contracts should be feasible. Borensztein and Mauro
[2004] discuss the feasibility of GDP-indexed bonds and report preliminary estimates of their
benefits.3
Commodity bonds are proposed by Caballero [2002]. Kletzer, Newbery and Wright [1992]
suggest that commodity-price linked derivatives can be combined with international bonds to
eliminate sovereign default risk. They use the one-sided commitment model, so that foreign
investors sell put options on export commodity prices to the debtor. The debtor exercises the put13
options when the commodity price falls below the strike price. This puts a floor on the value of
the debtor’s supply of primary exports eliminating default risk when commodity prices are low.
Similar put options can be suggested for GDP .
Consider atwo-stateexample, GDP equalsy1withconstant probability pand y2 with probability
1 − p. To make the example more general, let consumption be incompletely smoothed, so that
consumption equals c1 in state 1 and c2 in state 2 where c1 <c 2. The GDP-linked bond that


























The solution for the loan principal,  , and the repayments, R(yt), also solves the constraint on



































That is, for the symmetric information case, the full debt is forgiven for the lowest state.
These consumptions could also be implemented using a combination of a put and a call option
that would pay off, on net, c1 when the put is exercised and c2 when the call is exercised. Another
pair of contracts is to combine a GDP put option with a non-contingent foreign bond. The pair of



























2￿ (1 − p)
β (1 − β (1 − p))
(19)
with non-contingent repayments, R =  /β . In the case of foreign creditor commitment, the
steady state contracts are just these with c2 and c1 set equal because steady-state consumption is
fully smoothed when foreign insurance is available.14
These contracts clearly offer significant insurance for the sovereign debtor, but the gains from
creating such markets are subject to the caveat that asymmetries of information and moral hazard
are not yet introduced. Suppose that GDP put options were used to eliminate the idiosyncratic
growth risk to ensure the capacity of public and private borrowers in an emerging market to repay
bonds and loans as contracted with non-contingent interest. The put premium would equal the
expectation of the potential drop in GDP over the term of the option as shown by equation (18).
For a commodity-dependent exporting country, export revenue risk could be insured using
put options. Since markets for important commodity derivatives exist and are liquid, the
issue for policy is whether the term of such options can match market cycles. Options with
near-term expiration dates are not useful for insuring aggregate debt service requirements. Pricing
sufficiently long options may not be a practical difficulty but market liquidity could be.
4. Debt Contracts and Infrequent Renegotiation
The market equilibrium discussed thus far is implemented by implicit contracts in which
state-contingent repayment is common. Thisimplies that renegotiation of traditional debt contracts
would be frequent. The model also assumes no asymmetries of information. Moral hazard in
international debt restructuring is thought to be important and motivates an incomplete information
extension of the model. Asymmetric information about debtor willingness to pay can also lead
to standard debt contracts with non-contingent repayment and infrequent renegotiation. Again, a
model is only outlined.
Sovereign immunity is still represented by self-enforcement constraints, but the debtor’s
endowment is private information. A general model with hidden endowments is studied by Cole
and Kocherlakota [2002] without commitment constraints. These assumptions with one-sided
commitment are made by Thomas and Worrall [1990] with a finite support for the borrower’s
endowment. They prove that an equilibrium exists with two-sided self-enforcement constraints.
Contracts are chosen so that the sovereign debtor reveals its hidden endowment in its choice
of contract. Contracts are incentive compatible. They are also complicated. Using the hidden
endowment model captures essentials of moral hazard in debt renegotiation.. Moral hazard in
policy choices by sovereigns is modeled by Atkeson [1991], and in a simple model of debt
renegotiation by Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody [2004].15
The equilibrium is found by again maximizing debtor surplus over autarchy,











subject to the self-enforcement constraints for the debtor and creditors,
Vt+1 ≥ 0 and U
c
t+1 ≥ 0,
equation (7a) and an additional set of incentive compatibility constraints. The incentive
compatibility constraints are written as
Vt (yt,y t) ≥ Vt (θt,y t) for θt = y
1,...,y
N,
where the notation summarizes that consumption and promised creditor surplus vary depend on
reported endowment, θt.
A surprising simplification arises if the support for the endowment is a continuous closed
interval. Following Townsend [1979], the incentive compatible contract will be a conventional
short-term bond contract as long as the self-enforcement constraint does not bind with positive
probability in the repayment period. The dynamics of the permanent income model also inform
us. A low realization for output, when the sovereign immunity constraint does not bind, leads
to repayment of interest and an increase in the outstanding debt. The expected marginal utility
of consumption rises. A high realization leads to partial debt amortization, reducing outstanding
debt, and the expected marginal utility of consumption falls.4
What happens when the constraint binds? The Euler condition is not satisfied since the country
is at a corner, so that
u
￿ (ct) ≥ Etu
￿ (ct+1). (20)
Incentive compatibility allows characterization of the new implicit contract. For u￿ (ct) >










under the contract for period t, and the contract must repeat itself. That is, the debtor’s utility will
remain the same in period t+1if u  (ct) >E tu  (ct+1) under the implicit contract. This contract is
the lower bound for the debtor. Therefore, for any state such that u  (ct) >E tu  (ct+1), the debtor
receives the same contract for the next period implying that the same net repayment must be made16
in all these states. If this were not true, the debtor would claim it was in the state with the lowest
current net repayment required. Incentive compatibility rules this out. The next step is to observe
that this can only be the lowest utility contract satisfying the self-enforcement constraint, equation
(21), if ct = yt when the self-enforcement constraint binds and u  (ct) >E tu  (ct+1).
If, instead, u  (ct) <E tu  (ct+1) and sovereign immunity binds, then the debtor makes a net
repayment and is rewarded with higher utility under the contract taken in period t +1 . Under this
incentive compatible contract, the borrower’s consumption is given by
ct = yt for yt ≤ ￿ y,
ct <y t for yt > ￿ y
and ct is increasing in yt for all y. The critical value, ￿ y, is in the interior of the support for debtor
output. The debtor’s surplus over autarchy in the next period contract will also be increasing in
y. All this implies that creditor’s claims remain constant in this contract for yt ≤ ￿ y and decrease
between t and t +1if yt > ￿ y.
What happens in the subsequent period if yt > ￿ y helps us to interpret the equilibrium contracts.
The borrower receives a contract that gives it surplus over autarchy.. This is the same a reduction
in its debt. Since creditors do not observe yt ever but do observe the payments made to or by
the sovereign debtor, their surplus, Uc
t, in the market is not state contingent. Conventional debt
satisfies these conditions. If in period t +1 , the self-enforcement constraint will not bind with
positive probability, the new implicit contract is a conventional short-term bond contract with
certain repayment. On the other hand, if the sovereign immunity constraint can bind with positive
probability, the bond contract will not be fulfilled with certainty. A risk premium will be added to
the riskless interest rate, (1/β −1).
When the sovereign immunity constraint binds and yt ≤ ￿ y, the contract repeats implying that
creditor surplus is the same in period t+1as in period t but no net payments are made in period t.




implying that only net interest is lost in renegotiation. This is the worst that happens to creditors in
equilibrium, although interest is lost when theborrower’s indebtedness is greatest. The equilibrium
can be implemented by a conventional bond with renegotiation in low states when the debt level
is sufficiently high. Renegotiation of repayments is necessary only when the debtor’s utility and17
endowment are both sufficiently low. There is an upper bound on the true present value of the
country’s debt given by D = U
c
.
One more step is needed for understanding debt renegotiation.. Continuity of the support for
debtor output implies continuity in the implicit contract for any debt level. For the highest debt
level, a rise in y leads to both net capital outflows from the debtor and a reduction in future debt.
This means that any repayments, however small, include debt amortization. If this were not true,
the debtor would not benefit from repaying anything since the country’s welfare would not be
raised in the future by doing so. There must a future benefit. That means that all the current
interest is implicitly forgiven in debt renegotiation when yt ≤ ￿ y and some interest is forgiven for
higher y until all the interest is paid plus additional debt amortization for the highest output level.















indicates the dependence of the implicit contingent interest rate on the borrower’s
debt and current output.
5. Implementation with Bonds
Adding imperfect information implies that debt renegotiations do not occur continuously and only
occur in low output states for high outstanding debt. These stylize the facts of debt defaults and
restructurings in emerging markets. Because contracts need to reveal private debtor information,
it is natural to think of the state-contingent parts of the implicit contracts as the outcome of
renegotiations between creditors and sovereigns who are better informed than their creditors about
their willingness to pay.
The implications for country insurance are two fold. The first is that the required insurance
needs to cover at a maximum the net interest on outstanding foreign debt. This is much smaller
than the coverage needed under perfect information, but it is smaller because the welfare benefits
of access to foreign credit are smaller as a consequence of asymmetric information. The second
is troublesome because any derivatives that are used to strip the renegotiation risk need to be
incentive compatible for the debtor.
Consider a swap of the risky interest payments on the debt, r(yt,D t)Dt, for riskless interest18
payments made with certainty, (1/β − 1)Dt. Bondholders swap away the risky net interest
payments to counterparties who hold risky, default, swaps. The contingency for the risky interest
payments is the reported output for the debtor, not an independently observed signal. The
renegotiable debt contracts are incentive compatible because the borrower’s debt is reduced (partly
amortized) at the same moment that it makes a contingent interest payment. If these are separated
across foreign creditors, then the incentives for truthful reporting can fail. Debt amortization and
risky interest payments need to be linked. This is a problem of market incompleteness due to
moral hazard.
On the positive side, the information asymmetry might be viewed as a theoretical artifice
to generate lending using conventional bond contracts with infrequent debt restructuring and
ignored as a barrier to GDP or otherwise indexed derivatives. Perhaps this could be justified by
assuming that the diversification needs of foreign investors and the costs of underwriting bonds
and loans are such that bondholders delegate monitoring of sovereign debtors. If the monitoring
costs are fixed, bond markets will be greatly disadvantaged relative to syndicated bank lending to
emerging markets. Banks can internalize the costs once for all depositors as delegated monitors,
while bondholders each need to be informed. Implementing the interest swap would support bond
lending under these circumstances if the risky interest payments can be purchased by an informed
investor. The informed investor would play the role of a delegated monitor.
Under these conditions, bonds would be issued with non-contingent interest that would be paid
unless the debtor deviated from the implicit contract, effectively repudiating its obligations in
part or whole. The holder of the interest swap would guarantee bondholder interest and monitor
the debtor’s circumstances. This could be separated further by considering a series of options
based on debtor performance, say GDP . For example, a GDP put option could pay interest. In the
equilibrium for the model, risky interest payments rise with GDP for high debt levels. A series
of puts with different strikes covering different shares of the interest payments on country debt
could be used to fine tune the derivatives that underwrite bondholder interest. Bonds may need to
include covenants requiring insurance against interest defaults of this nature. Such covenants may
need to bind on a domestic agent rather than the foreign debtor because bondholder monitoring
of the derivative holdings of the debtor could only be more costly than enforcing GDP-indexed
interest payments. Structuring such interest swaps to facilitate bond borrowing without the risk19
of default could also be a way to support international borrowing by non-sovereign debtors in
emerging markets. An emerging market government itself could implement requirements that
shift the interest risk away from bondholders to other willing investors.
6. Contractual Innovation to Reduce Renegotiation Costs
The debateover reforming theinternational financial architecture focused on two alternatives in
recent years, a statutory approach and a contractual approach. At this date, the statutory approach,
which would introduce some form of international bankruptcy procedures for sovereigns, is on
hold and all but abandoned for the time. The contractual approach is being pursued in the form
of wider spread adoption of collective action clauses in sovereign bond issues, notably those
issued in the United States. The collective action clauses of concern allow a qualified majority of
bondholders to be decisive over restructurings of the repayment terms of bonds.5
There are two aspects to the debate over encouraging the adoption of collective action clauses.
Enabling renegotiation can raise welfare ex post, in the event of a bond default, but it can lower
it ex ante if the net effect is to reduce capital inflows to emerging markets. The second effect can
arise if reducing the costs of default raises the incidence of default. As argued in Section 2, it is
not easy to make renegotiation welfare reducing even under debtor moral hazard. Eichengreen,
Kletzer and Mody [2004] use a reduced model of willingness to pay to allow for asymmetric
information and debtor moral hazard following the renegotiation model in Kletzer [2003]. They
compare unanimous action clause bonds and collective action clause bonds in this simple model.
Under unanimous action clauses, some creditors will hold out in renegotiation in equilibrium
leading to costly delays to agreement. Under collective action clauses, a sufficient minority of
bondholders to hold up renegotiations will not do so. They are worse off delaying agreement than
joining the majority in taking a negotiated settlement immediately. Eichengreen, et al show that
the effects of collective action clauses on lending are ambiguous and depend upon the degree of
debtor moral hazard present. Lending can contract for high risk borrowers, but this should not be
interpreted as welfare reducing. The borrower can receive more insurance with lower debt and
avoid debt restructuring costs under unanimous action clauses.
Eichengreen, et al estimate the impact of collective action clauses on interest rate spreads and
the probability of issuance for emerging market bonds, both sovereign and non-sovereign, and20
proxy for moral hazard using country credit ratings. Low-rated issuers face higher spreads from
collective actions clauses, while high-rated issuers face lower spreads. The second question in the
debate concerns these results. The spread differences are small implying that collective action
clauses do not matter much.
The main counterargument to contractual innovation is that foreign debt renegotiation may
be made difficult as a market outcome enabling capital flows. The contractual innovations
that the sovereign borrowing models summarized here point toward may address this issue in
addition to introducing contingent contracts that reduce the need for costly debt renegotiations.
Separating conventional bonds from risky GDP-indexed, commodity-price or otherwise indexed
derivatives could support international markets in low-risk assets that simply are not renegotiated.
This addresses the first issue. Reducing the incidence of costly renegotiations by formalizing
contingencies in contracts that can be held by sophisticated investors can also raise welfare by
increasing risk sharing for public and private borrowers in emerging markets.
7. Conclusion
External debt in emerging market economies is often a source of macroeconomic volatility,
requiring increasing current account balances and fiscal contractions in the face of adverse
productivity or international price shocks. Adverse macroeconomic shocks often lead to foreign
debt repayment problems in heavily indebted countries, resulting in domestic financial distress. In
many instances, sovereign debt restructuring has been a difficult, prolonged and costly process.
These events stand in stark contrast with the presumption that access to international capital
markets should help countries to smooth domestic private and public consumption and investment
over macroeconomic cycles.
The theoretical analysis of debt in the presence of international risk sharing incentives suggests
that debt renegotiation serves to implement an implicit contingent repayment schedule for
international credit. The experience of debt crises and debt renegotiation can be interpreted as
indicating a need for easing sovereign debt renegotiation. It might also be interpreted as creating a
need for contractual innovation in international finance by more creative application of financial
innovations in the most advanced financial markets to emerging market finance. The theoretical
models described suggest that derivative contracts might be useful for sharing risk eliminating21
bond renegotiation as a way of trying to implement risk sharing. Such derivatives would allow
debtors to insure themselves as parties to the contracts while reducing default and restructuring
risk for bondholders. If markets in such securities are feasible, they could reduce macroeconomic
volatility in indebted countries and increase capital flows to emerging market economies.22
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Endnotes
1Thesurvey, Eaton, GersovitzandStiglitz[1986], givesafulloverviewofthemodernapproach
to modeling country risk.
2The argument that reputational equilibria are not credible is addressed by Kletzer and Wright
[2000]whoshowthatrenegotiation-proofequilibriawithfreelenderentryexistswithself-enforcement
constraints. Mark Wright [2001] proves that this result survives creditor commitment if creditors
are imperfectly competitive.
3CordellaandLevyY eyati[2004]discussthechallengeofadversepolicyincentivesundermoral
hazard for country insurance.
4The formalization of the equilibrium in this economy awaits a forthcoming paper.
5A review of the policy issues is found in Dixon and Wall (Bank of England) [2000].